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ESSAY
THE SHAPING FORCE OF CORPORATE LAW IN THE NEW
ECONOMIC ORDER
Jeffrey N. Gordon*
I am very grateful for the opportunity afforded by this Allen
Chair lecture. I grew up in Richmond. During my formative
years, between zero and two, my family lived in an apartment
on Grace Street, and my mother would push me in the stroller
around the block of Lombardy and Grace, where the T.C. Wil-
liams Law School was once located. Given all we know about
psychology, it surely must be the case that the subliminal sug-
gestion of legal studies at that crucial time accounts for my
present occupation as a law professor.
My topic for this Allen Chair lecture is the shaping force of
corporate governance in the new economic order. It is easy to
think of corporate law as an arcane field with mysterious terms
and peculiar rules, ultimately of interest only to those who are
prepared to bill at least 2000 hours a year to unravel its com-
plexities. This is the view that there is a pointless mystery
about shareholders, directors, common stocks, debentures, and
* Copyright 1997, Jeffrey N. Gordon. Professor of Law and Co-Director of the
Center for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to faculty
and students of the University of Richmond Law School, particularly Professor Azizah
al-Hibri, for what can only be called southern hospitality and for comments on the
original lecture. Thanks as well to Bernie Black, Jack Coffee, Ron Gilson, and Mark
Roe for extended conversation on some of the matters herein. For financial support of
the larger project, of which this is a part, I am grateful to the Sloan Foundation and
the Sloan Corporate Governance Project at Columbia Law School.
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the bizarre creature my class encountered recently, a convert-
ible exchangeable cumulative preferred stock; and that ulti-
mately corporate law and practice consists of the expert manip-
ulation of formal rules and practices, which is of importance to
the particular parties in a particular matter, but of little global
importance.
I want to articulate a different position: that corporate law,
and the associated corporate governance regime, is a very im-
portant variable in determining economic performance. I want
to explore this thesis in terms of the shaping influence of corpo-
rate law, in what I call the New Economic Order.' I then want
to take up Virginia corporate law, which, as reflected in the
outcome of the control contest for the Shenandoah Valley poul-
try producer, WLR, takes a decidedly negative stance on the
market in corporate control.2 Anti-takeover animus has pro-
duced anti-takeover laws in Virginia that seriously distort long-
standing corporate law norms governing the conduct of directors
and that sweep far beyond any defensible objective.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE LAW
By "corporate governance," I mean the mechanisms by which
various marketplace signals, particularly from product markets
and capital markets, directly influence the makeup of the man-
agement team that makes economic decisions for the firm, and
in that way, indirectly influence the economic decisions them-
selves. This is a somewhat broader, more abstract conception
than "corporate governance" regarded as simply the arrange-
ments between and among shareholders, the board, and the
management team. "Corporate law" is a critical, but by no
means necessarily determinative, element in a corporate gover-
nance regime.
Indeed, corporate governance may be thought of as a function
of five distinct elements: a state's statutory regime; a state's
common law of "fiduciary duties," which constrains actions that
would be technically permissible under the statutes; the federal
1. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1519 (1997).
2. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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securities system of mandatory disclosure of firm-specific infor-
mation and the regulation of the proxy voting by shareholders;
the corporation's internal governance procedures; and the struc-
ture of share ownership of the particular firm and of firms gen-
erally. "Internal governance," itself, is a broad category that
includes several sorts of structural decisions undertaken by
particular firms operating within the general framework of an
enabling corporate law regime. These include: (1) structural
decisions in the charter (and thus requiring shareholder ap-
proval for change) setting forth, for example, the size of the
board and whether it is subject to annual turnover or "classi-
fied"; (2) structural decisions about the board undertaken by
the board itself, such as the allocation of board seats between
insiders and outsiders; and (3) structural decisions made by the
board about the ability of the shareholders to accept an unsolic-
ited tender offer for their stock, as through a "poison pill."
The structure of share ownership is an important indepen-
dent factor in determining the governance implications of a
given state corporate law regime. In the classic story of the
public corporation told by my Columbia predecessors, Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means, in the 1930s, the dispersal of share
ownership necessitated by the corporation's need to raise equity
capital from diverse sources produced the separation of owner-
ship from control.3 My current colleague, Mark Roe, has argued
that this dispersed ownership pattern was also significantly
influenced by a host of legal barriers to the holding of concen-
trated blocks of stock by financial intermediaries, these barriers
arising at least in part because of populist concerns about face-
less aggregations of wealth and power.4 Whatever the cause,
the result is fragmented ownership of the public corporation
and governance implications that follow. Dispersed shareholders
will find it difficult and expensive to coordinate their actions, as
through contested board elections, to replace management even
under a corporate law regime (and internal governance rules)
that make it relatively easy.
3. See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).
4. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLrcAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE at vii-xvii (1994).
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The rise of institutional investor activism, beginning in the
late 1980s, shows the governance implications of share owner-
ship.5 Under the same legal regimes that produced decades of
shareholder quiescence, firms now began facing insistent calls
for restructuring internal governance procedures, including in-
creasing the percentage of board outsiders and establishing
codes of conduct for exercise of the board's oversight functions.
Indeed, institutions have mounted successful campaigns against
chief executive officers believed to be underperforming and have
changed the nature of hostile takeover bids.
Hostile bids ultimately depend, however, on the strictly legal
mechanisms of corporate governance, the corporate law. In
getting a majority of the stock, the acquirer obtains the power
to elect the board and, thus, control the firm's business deci-
sions. Beginning in the mid-1980s, boards began adopting so-
called shareholder rights plans, or "poison pills," which impose
a severe financial penalty on an acquirer who obtains a control-
ling percentage without management approval. Potential
acquirers came to realize that they could mobilize activist insti-
tutions to use their voting power to replace resistant boards,
and began to couple hostile bids with consent solicitations or
proxy contests. 6 The point is that the same legal regime oper-
5. The rise of institutional shareholder activism is a story with two distinct
elements, an increase in equity ownership and then an increase in activism. In 1950,
institutional investors-banks, mutual funds, life insurance companies, and pension
funds-held only approximately six percent of the U.S. equity market; by the mid-
1980's, they held nearly fifty percent, an ownership percentage which has increased
at a slower rate since. See 2 THE BRANCATO REPORT, PArTERNS OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTMENT AND CONTROL IN THE USA 42 (1995) [hereinafter BRANCATO REPORT].
This ownership change was fueled by the adoption in 1974 of the Employee Retire-
ment and Income Security Act (ERISA), which requires funding of the pension prom-
ises of deferred benefit plans, and the growing belief on the part of individual inves-
tors that investing through financial intermediaries could enhance diversification and
reduce the transaction costs of investing. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)
The increase in institutional shareholder activism-and, here, one must be care-
ful not to overstate the extent of it-arose out of the stresses of the takeover move-
ment in the 1980s (and managements increasingly successful efforts to enlist legisla-
tures and courts in anti-takeover measures). Many institutions, particularly public
pension funds pursuing an indexing diversification strategy, came to realize that their
inability to exit freely from an underperforming stock provided a reason to try to
exert change through governance mechanisms.
6. For further thoughts about the board's power over the firm's receptiveness to
hostile bids, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills,
and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
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ates very differently as a matter of corporate governance de-
pending on whether a particular firm's shares are held by dis-
persed or concentrated owners, and more broadly, the general
shareholding pattern across firms. That is, it is not only that
governance operates differently in particular firms depending on
the ownership structure of that firm, but that general owner-
ship patterns may have systemic effects through the creation of
new marketplace institutions and by the conditioning of expec-
tations of the various governance actors, including boards and
managers. For example, widespread institutional ownership has
led to the various information gathering and advice-rendering
activities of the Council of Institutional Investors. Similarly,
boards and managements now seem much more receptive to en-
gagement with large institutional owners than at the outset of
institutional activism in the 1980s.
In cataloguing the sources of a corporate governance regime,
it is also possible to include the role played by creditors, whose
oversight operates less through corporate law than through the
custom-tailored vehicle of a loan agreement or a bond inden-
ture. For example, creditor monitoring operates directly through
the financial requirement of loan repayment and also through
the signaling entailed in discretionary decisions such as wheth-
er or not to roll over a current obligation or extend a credit
line.' Creditor monitoring plays a more significant corporate
governance role in countries with a tradition of bank-centered
financing, such as Japan or Germany. The monitoring role is
enhanced by significant bank ownership, either direct or indi-
rect, of corporate equity and, in some cases, exercise of proxy
power over customers' shares on deposit.
Finally, it is also possible to imagine a corporate governance
regime that explicitly sought to include influences beyond exter-
nal marketplace signals. Arguably, the German system of
codetermination, in which employee representatives sit on the
"supervisory board" in a two-board structure, extends the objec-
tives of the corporate governance regime beyond shareholder
511 (1997).
7. For a useful current discussion, see Ronald J. Daniels & George G. Triantis,
The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1077
(1995).
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interests. Similarly, in the United States, some have argued
that the interests of various stakeholders or constituencies oth-
er than shareholders, should be addressed in managerial
decision making and have proposed governance schemes to im-
plement this.8 But as demonstrated by the adoption of "constit-
uency statutes" that permit, rather than mandate, a board to
consider non-shareholder interests, no consensus in the United
States has developed in favor of alternative governance objec-
tives.
In thinking in a general way about corporate governance,
particularly on a comparative dimension, it is also important to
bear in mind the distinction between the "substitutability" and
"complementarity" of various governance institutions. For exam-
ple, some have argued that an appropriately energetic board is
a "substitute" for the market in corporate control, meaning that
both institutions ensure managerial accountability to sharehold-
er interests.? It is also possible to see the institutions as com-
plements, meaning that the control market enhances the
board's role as a monitor by buttressing the board's resolve to
insist on managerial performance. Others have argued that
large blockholdings can be a complement to a system in which
employees play a significant governance role because only a
large blockholder would have the resources to resist a tilt
against shareholder interests in such a setting."0
II. THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER
The New Economic Order is the regime of economic liberal-
ization ascendant in the United States for at least the past
fifteen years. It has changed the competitive environment so as
to place a premium on the firm's capacity to adapt quickly to
changing competitive conditions. Important features include
relatively open and flexible markets in goods, capital and labor,
both domestically and internationally. The economic consequenc-
8. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist:
Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. - (1997)
9. See, e.g., Ira M. Milstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW.
1485 (1993).
10. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Mar-
kets, 1998 COLuM. BUS. L. REV. 167.
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es have been dramatic, particularly in the sharp distinctions
between winners and losers. Shareholders as a group have been
enormous winners. The overall level of corporate profits has
significantly increased throughout the period, by a total of near-
ly 300% in real terms, as have average stock prices. Although
particular firms have failed in the competitive struggle, open
capital markets have provided shareholders with ample diversi-
fication opportunities while the overall trend is powerfully up.
The story for employees is much more complex. In a nutshell,
median wages are flat and wage inequality among income
groups has grown; on the other hand, declining unemployment
has increased the number of wage earners and provided wages
to those who, otherwise, would have had no job. On balance,
the aggregate income effects have to be counted on the negative
side of the employee ledger. Real median wages have not grown
very much during the period, perhaps five percent total, obvi-
ously much less than the growth in corporate profits or stock
prices. This effect persists when various corrections are taken
for demographic factors, such as changing family size and the
entry of women into the work force, and also persists for vari-
ous measures of employee compensation." An even more seri-
ous concern arises from the changing shape of the distribution.
Real wages are declining in the bottom quintile and increasing
at the top, and the number in the middle is a diminishing
group. Thus, while a select group of employees are reaping
significant gains, those gains are concentrated at the very top
of the wage distribution, the top five percent and especially the
top one percent.'
The ambiguous impact of the New Economic Order on em-
ployee welfare also results from an arguable increase in job
instability (the actual facts are in dispute). Highly publicized
layoffs by firms such as AT&T at times of record profits (not
just at a low point in the business cycle) have left many em-
ployees feeling insecure. Looked at in the aggregate, the gener-
al rate of employee displacement is not higher than earlier
comparable periods. Nevertheless, recent displacements have
been highly salient, in part, because the targets have increas-
11. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1534-38.
12. See id. at 1538.
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ingly included white collar employees and have hit those in mid
or end-career positions, where the economic consequences have
been very significant for the affected individuals. Moreover,
most employees, unlike shareholders, cannot adequately diversi-
fy their firm specific risks. The diversification opportunities
available in labor markets-for example, the acquiring of gener-
al, not firm specific skills, or retraining-are not nearly as
effective as simple portfolio diversification, and employees typi-
cally do not have enough wealth to hedge the financial asset
represented by their salary stream.
Against these employee effects must be weighed the dramatic
increase in employment levels and the reduction of unemploy-
ment-a great boon to those who would fall off the wage distri-
bution if unemployed. The U.S. economy has been creating jobs
at a rate that is the envy of the developed world. While
Western Europe suffers from unemployment rates edging be-
yond twelve percent, U.S. unemployment has fallen below five
percent for the first time in a generation. These comparisons
probably understate the real disparity in unemployment levels
because rising unemployment discourages people from seeking
work and, thus, lowers the reported statistic while declining
unemployment works conversely. Greater employment opportu-
nities not only enhance incomes, particularly of those at the
bottom, but produce far-reaching social welfare benefits as well.
The New Economic Order, in significant measure, is due to
the product of three interlinked legal regimes-trade, labor, and
corporate governance.'" The importance of the trade regime
and the labor regime to the New Economic Order has been
widely recognized. The third element, the corporate governance
regime, has an impact which I think has not been sufficiently
appreciated. In particular, one of the most important choices
made in a governance regime is the extent to which the man-
agement team is exposed to capital market pressures because
the signals conveyed by capital markets would lead to quicker
13. This is not to deny the significance of various elements of domestic macroeco-
nomic policy, including the management of interest rates and monetary supply by the
Federal Reserve and the fiscal policies at the federal level that particularly affect
aggregate demand or the savings rate.
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responses to changing competitive conditions. This adaptability
may be a key element of success in the global marketplace.
III. TRADE
The liberalized trade regime arises principally from the post-
World War II set of multilateral agreements that have reduced
tariff and non-tariff barriers to the movement of goods across
international borders. The importance of a liberalized trade
regime to the New Economic Order comes principally from
intensified product market pressures and new product market
opportunities. Firms face competitive threats from all over the
world and in turn have the opportunity to pursue competitive
advantage on a worldwide scale. The competitive threats can
take different forms, such as product innovation (e.g., the Sony
Walkman), organizational innovation (e.g., the Japanese produc-
tion methods that cut costs and raised quality standards for
cars), or negative comparative advantage in the supply of a key
input (e.g., lower labor costs that give East Asia textiles a price
advantage).
The fall and rise of the U.S. automobile industry over the
periods of the 1970s through the 1990s is instructive. In the
wake of the 1973 oil embargo, fuel-efficient Japanese cars made
significant inroads into the U.S. automobile market. U.S. con-
sumers found they liked not only the fuel efficiency, but also
the quality and reliability of the Japanese imports. Sales by
domestic producers contracted; if not for a government loan
guarantee program in the late 1970s, Chrysler Corporation
would have been forced into bankruptcy. A "voluntary" import
quota obtained by the U.S. industry as a protectionist counter-
measure partially backfired. It pushed the Japanese into the
production and import of larger (and more profitable) cars-a
market segment in which U.S. manufacturers had previously
been relatively unchallenged. This product market pressure
reduced the U.S. industry's share of the domestic market from
87% in 1974 to 79% in 1991 and dramatically reduced the prof-
itability of the industry as well. But there is a flipside: U.S.
firms came to adopt Japanese production techniques (e.g., "just
in time" inventory controls and team-based production) and by
1994 had recovered to a 86% domestic market share in addition
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to gaining an increased share of the worldwide market for auto-
mobiles. All three major firms, especially Ford, were highly
profitable and stock prices recovered and advanced. (For exam-
ple, in 1986 Ford stock traded between $9 and $16 a share; in
1996, between $27 and $37 a share.)
The connection between trade liberalization and the employee
income effects described above is hotly contested. The most
straightforward argument is that trade liberalization makes
possible the substitution of lower-wage foreign labor for domes-
tic labor (through the mechanism of locating, or relocating,
plants offshore and importing goods back) and that this threat
has become the means by which employers constrain employee
wage demands.
The alternative explanation for the employee income effects is
described in terms of "skill-biased" technological change-
meaning that technological change drives the production process
in a way that favors skilled over unskilled workers. Returns to
education and experience are increasing and the income penalty
associated with a lack of such skills is becoming more severe.
Even on this account, however, trade liberalization plays an
important role because heightened product market pressure is
often the progenitor of technological change. It is not that the
competitive pressure can, willy-nilly, produce technological ad-
vance. However, this pressure can make such discoveries and
their rapid commercial application more valuable, both defen-
sively (protection against inroads) and offensively (new markets
to conquer). On both accounts, the liberalized trade regime
plays a crucial role in intensifying the competitive regime that
can dramatically affect firm profitability as well as reshape the
wage structure.
IV. LABOR
The labor regime is an important background constraint on
the adaptation to economic change, particularly affecting the
degree of flexibility and rate of adaptation. Labor regimes oper-
ate in at least two ways which are relevant to economic change.
The first is by regulatory imposition of standard terms on wag-
es and conditions of employment, for example: protection
against layoffs or arbitrary dismissal; restrictions on maximum
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workhours (at least provisions for overtime pay); and mandato-
ry fringe benefits. In all of these direct impositions, the defini-
tion of "employee" entitled to protection is itself a critical ques-
tion. The second regulatory method is by grant and protection
of bargaining endowments, that is, the right to organize and
bargain collectively under a statute such as the National Labor
Relations Act. Instead of direct protections, the employees are
given bargaining endowments that would enhance their collec-
tive capacity to contract for such protections with the employer.
Not only would such endowments make it easier for employees
as a group to formulate tradeoffs between wage and non-wage
amenities, but they would strengthen employees' capacity to
insist on a sharing with stockholders of the transition costs
associated with economic change.
One of the remarkable features of the U.S. regulatory land-
scape has been the changes that did not occur in the labor law
regime. Despite the greater employment instability associated
with the 1980s takeover movement (at least in popular percep-
tion if not always in fact) and the instability that continues
with the white collar layoffs of the 1990s, the labor regime has
remained stable. The particular regime is one that accords
employers great flexibility in responding to changing economic
circumstance. First, there has been no substantial regulatory
limitation on firms' ability to fire workers on a retail or whole-
sale basis. Although dismissal rights against firing for invidious
reasons (e.g., reasons of race, gender, or age) have been en-
hanced, the principle that the implied labor contract permits
dismissal for the firm's self-defined economic motives remains
firm. This employment flexibility has been enhanced by the
firm's continuing capacity to hire "temporary" workers or "con-
tract" workers who are not necessarily covered by legislative
protections for "employees." Thus, the firm can quickly change
the size and character of its workforce in response to changing
economic circumstances.
Second, there has been no augmentation of bargaining en-
dowments that would make it easier for employees to contract
for additional protections against the costs of economic adjust-
ments, or even to contract for additional compensation in light
of the additional economic risks borne by employees. For exam-
ple, legislative proposals that would forbid the replacement of
14831997]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1473
strikers by temporary workers and that would give employees a
choice of union representation through a consent solicitation
rather than an election, both failed in the Congress. 14 The im-
portance of bargaining endowments is borne out by the expe-
rience of the airline industry in the post-deregulatory era. Be-
cause most of the major carriers were unionized, employees
were relatively well insulated against wage reductions and
layoffs, despite the rise of non-unionized new entrants that
made existing labor contracts non-economic. In many cases,
employees were able to exchange concessions (which often con-
sisted of foregoing future wage increases and the agreement to
perform work in a more efficient manner) for equity participa-
tion in the airline. Similarly, the issue of part time employees
could be contracted in the 1997 contract dispute at UPS only
because the collective organization of the UPS workforce made
an economic struggle over the issue possible.
A liberalized trade and labor regime are reinforcing. Firms
that face greater actual and potential worldwide competition (or
worldwide opportunities) from a liberal trade regime may per-
ceive greater pressure to cut costs. Obviously, wages to margin-
al workers cannot be cut, but inframarginal workers may be
squeezed out. And of course, there are feedback effects to one
firm's attempts to gain a competitive advantage through cost
cutting, as firms try to leapfrog one another in that regard. A
flexible labor regime opens up many avenues to labor cost re-
duction: downsizing, changing the nature of the production
process (through automation, for example, or other capital-in-
tensive production), and a "just in time" labor force through a
temporary or contract work force (versus an "inventory" of full-
time workers not fully engaged at many moments). Such mea-
sures not only respond to the changing competitive conditions,
but they also intensify the competitive situation in the next
round.
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The third element of the legal regime that underpins the
New Economic Order is the corporate governance regime, which
14. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1531-32.
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affects the rate that a firm's response to changing competitive
conditions; this in turn affects the competitive environment
itself. A key change that emerged in the 1980s was the greater
exposure of the managerial team to evaluation by capital mar-
kets, because capital market signals, stock prices in particular,
provide a future-oriented measure of the firm's economic per-
formance. Accounting reports of current earnings provide valu-
able information and are the most common alternative measure
of performance. However, even putting aside the manipulability
of accounting data (at least in the short run) by astute manage-
ment, accounting reports are an incomplete measure of mana-
gerial performance. Accounting results measure and report on
prior performance, today's return on yesterday's investments
and strategic choices. Stock prices, by contrast, reflect the
market's judgment about future returns on current and future
expected investment and strategic choices. Information about
prior performance becomes relevant to judging how the firm
responds to changing competitive circumstances. Moreover,
performance measurement through stock market judgement is
quick: something that will affect returns two years hence will
be rapidly impounded into current stock prices.
Similarly, other signals about product market performance
may be hard to interpret and in any event may reflect more
about the firm's past than its future. Is a sales decline the
result of a business cycle fluctuation that should quickly re-
verse itself, or a deterioration in comparative product quality?
Do higher (or lower) profits predict future trends? Moreover, a
once-successful firm can live off its accumulated capital for
many years before poor product market performance delivers
the fatal blow. All of this is to say that stock price signals
carry more news quicker than summary product market signals;
a firm whose managers feel the necessity to respond to capital
market signals will move quicker and will adapt more rapidly
to a changing competitive environment.
This analysis finds a link between capital market responsive-
ness and economic success in the current worldwide economic
environment, based on the argument that adaptability to
changing competitive conditions is now especially valuable. The
skeptic might point to alternative corporate governance regimes
in Germany and Japan, for example, that eschew hostile take-
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overs, yet result in economic prosperity. In those systems, man-
agerial monitoring is performed by financial intermediaries or
by other industrial companies with crossholdings. The recent
sustained success of U.S. firms in the New Economic Order
may challenge the functional equivalence of alternative gover-
nance models. That is a complicated question for another day.
The short answer, however, is that in the absence of these
monitoring alternatives in the U.S. system, capital market re-
sponsiveness is essential. For reasons of politics and history,
stock ownership in the United States was fragmented and dis-
persed; the recent patterns of institutional ownership and activ-
ism are still quite limited in their monitoring capacity.
The skeptic may also complain that the available capital
market signals-stock prices-are too imperfect to use as a
cornerstone for a corporate governance system. Stock prices are
indeed imperfect signals, noisy both because of private informa-
tion withheld from markets for competitive reasons and because
of market volatity that may result from the flaws in the way
markets (and market participants) assess information. Market
spasms like the several hundred point gyrations of the Dow-
Jones Industrial Average during late October 1997 are just the
visible manifestation of the confounding potential for prices that
fluctuate enormously around "intrinsic value." But this is only
an argument for placing some governor on the most extreme
forms of capital market responsiveness. As I have elsewhere
stated, "one part of the corporate governance design problem is
devising a regime that will encourage managerial responsive-
ness to the real economic information carried in stock prices
while avoiding hair-trigger arbitrage transactions based on the
gap between stock prices and alternative measures of value."15
The present corporate governance regime is a long way from
the worrisome hair-trigger.
The changes in corporate governance that triggered and now
sustain managerial responsiveness to capital market signals are
a complicated series of events involving changes in the legal
regime, ownership patterns, and contractual arrangements. The
15. See Gordon, supra note 6, at 513.
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"reorientation" of corporate governance to take stronger account
of capital market signals has been supported by what might be
called a "norm cascade," a pronounced and reasonably sudden
shift in the attitudes and local culture of many corporate actors,
particularly board members. One very important question is
whether the corporate governance regime that sustains capital
market responsiveness will survive the managerialist counter-
pressures for a regime more protective of their autonomy.
The current regime has its genesis in the newly emerging
takeover activity of the 1960s, spurred by increasing efficiency
and liquidity in capital markets. As stock markets developed,
stock prices became an increasingly reliable measure of the
value of the firm under current management and poor stock
market performance became an increasingly reliable signal of
an arbitrage opportunity. Market liquidity meant that, for many
firms, a takeover entrepreneur could successfully make a gener-
al offer to acquire a controlling or majority interest, a "tender
offer." To curb sudden, short-fuse offers that could perhaps
capture firms at a bargain price, Congress in 1968 adopted the
Williams Act. The Act established minimum time periods for
tender offer activity designed to give targets and target share-
holders time to reflect and respond, and which also gave a
regulatory role to the SEC."6 One of the important ironies of
this legislation is that the resulting regulatory framework legiti-
mated hostile tender offers as an accepted business practice and
opened the way for hostile takeover activity by a broader array
of market participants.
As the hostile takeover movement expanded in the 1970s,
managers increasingly looked to state legislatures for protec-
tion. Managers built lobbying campaigns around the alleged
threat to in-state jobs and "corporate citizenship." Not far in
the background, however, was management's threat to shift the
situs of incorporation to a more accommodating forum. Wave
after wave of anti-takeover legislation was adopted in response
to this "managerialist" pressure. From the perspective of en-
hancing managerial exposure to capital markets, the crucial
legal move was the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision Edgar v.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
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Mite,'7 which struck down many such state measures as hav-
ing been preempted by the Williams Act and as impermissibly
burdening interstate commerce." Important judicial decisions
in Delaware permitted a restrained form of managerial resis-
tance to hostile takeovers that slowed down the process, raised
the costs to an acquirer, and perhaps discouraged some
bids-but left ample room for a determined acquirer willing to
pay a significant market premium for the target. 9
If the U.S. Supreme Court turned up the takeover heat in
1982, its 1987 decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America0 turned it down. In evaluating state anti-takeover
statutes, the Court decided that measures operated through the
state law framework for corporate governance were not pre-
empted by the Williams Act and did not impermissibly burden
commerce." The CTS decision opened the way to state corpo-
rate law regimes that were increasingly favorable to the resist-
ing target in a contested takeover bid. The state legislative law
changes also affected judicial decisions, possibly from the same
race-to-the-bottom competitive concerns that influenced the
legislature. Courts may also have been responding to growing
social concern about the disruptive effects associated with a
high level of takeover activity.2 One manifestation of this was
the Delaware Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,2' which substantially ex-
panded the board's freedom to reject a hostile bid.'
During this period of growing capital market activity and
shifting legal rules, there was another development with broad
implications for the corporate governance regime: the rise of
institutional investor ownership and activism. Throughout the
17. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
18. See id. at 640.
19. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (stat-
ing that defensive tactics must be proportional to the threat posed by hostile bids to
legitimate interests of corporations and shareholders); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) (noting that in sale of control, defen-
sive tactics must be aimed at obtaining the highest value reasonably available for
shareholders).
20. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
21. See id. at 81-86.
22. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1529-32.
23. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
24. See id. at 1150-53.
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1970s and 1980s, the institutional share of the U.S. equity
market increased from approximately 20% (1970) to 35% (1980)
to 50% (1990).2 During the course of this same period, institu-
tional behavior also underwent a significant change: away from
the Wall Street rule of "support management or sell the stock"
to various forms of activism. This activism displayed itself in
what may be considered a three-dimensional array. Along what
might be conceived of as the "structural/firm specific" axis,
institutional investor activism varied from measures designed to
enhance governance structures across a wide range of firms (for
example, outsider-director dominated boards, or separation of
the positions of board chairman and chief executive officer) to
measures targeted at specific firms deemed to be
underperforming (for example, efforts to replace senior manag-
ers or to shift business direction). Along the "active/passive"
axis, institutional activism varied from initiation or support of a
proxy battle (very active); identification of underperformers and
agitation for board response (somewhat active); identification of
underperformers and letting others act (active-passive); abstain-
ing or voting against the incumbent board without initiating a
proxy contest, a "just vote no" strategy (passive-active); or sale
into a premium offer (passive). Along the "formal/informal" axis,
institutional activism varied from shareholder proposals in the
management proxy statement requesting specific board action
(formal) to jawboning senior management about issues of con-
cern (informal).
The ability of institutions to coordinate their activities was
enhanced in 1992 by SEC rules that exempted institutional
investor corporate governance activity from time-consuming and
costly regulatory clearance.21 Though there is a debate about
whether institutions have generally been able to target specific
firms in ways that improve performance,2 even what might be
called the "latent activism" of institutional investors who will
support a control entrepreneur in a proxy contest or takeover
25. See BRANCATo REPORT, supra note 5, at 42.
26. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders Act, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-31326, Oct. 16, 1992, at *1, available in 1992 WL 301258.
27. The current empirical debate is canvassed in Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in THE NEW PALGRAVE Dic-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman, ed., forthcoming 1998).
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bid at an underperforming firm is itself an important new ele-
ment of the corporate governance regime.
Changes in the governance structure have also been support-
ed by private contracting. For example, executive compensation
is increasingly tied to a firm's stock market performance via
generous stock option grants that help align interests of manag-
ers and shareholders. The changes in governance have also
been supported by a significant shift in the attitude of direc-
tors, a norm cascade in favor of managerial responsiveness to
capital market signals. The pressures brought by these gover-
nance changes pushed directors in this direction. Even judicial
decisions that give boards significant (but not unlimited) lati-
tude to resist hostile takeover bids may nevertheless push di-
rectors toward market-favoring norms, because enhanced judi-
cial scrutiny of takeover defenses to a premium bid usefully
buttresses the board's independence from management. More-
over, the period provided cautionary tales of directors who ac-
quiesced too long to underperforming senior managements, im-
periling the survival of the firm, at IBM and GM, for example.
These stories also contributed to a norm shift from a gover-
nance regime responsive to capital market signals.
However, governance regimes are not necessarily stable.
There is significant counterpressure from managements who
want insulation from such capital market scrutiny. When such
counterpressure expresses itself as lobbying for legislative ac-
tion, it often strikes a sympathetic chord with legislatures that
would also like to satisfy constituent concerns about the greater
employment instability that the New Economic Order appears
to create. Capital markets seem harsh; backsliding is easy.
Thus, although there is now much greater consensus than dur-
ing the 1980s about the efficiency-enhancements of merger and
acquisition activity, the legal barriers to hostile acquisition have
become more formidable." Many states have adopted statutes
that permit a board to "just say no"; pivotal Delaware is argu-
ably tending in that direction in its elaboration of directors' du-
ties.29 Corporations are putting in place a new species of poi-
28. These are elaborated in Gordon, supra note 6, at 514-16.
29. The Delaware trend started with Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) and has continued with Unitrin v. American General
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son pill, the "deadhand pill," which requires the approval of
continuing directors for its dismantling. This is an effort to dis-
courage hostile bids by giving the incumbent board the power
to "just say never."
Institutional investor ownership and activism, although it
promotes capital market responsiveness, is not sufficient. Legal
rules matter because they set the framework within which
institutions (and catalytic forces like control entrepreneurs) can
act. Moreover, it may be that institutions are most effective in
their "latent activist" mode-providing votes to resist manageri-
al overreaching or to support, an insurgent in a proxy battle,
and as a willing seller to a hostile bidder.
Thus, legal rules that close down the market in corporate
control would significantly muffle capital market signals (and
undermine the existing corporate governance regime) for three
reasons. First, such a change would eliminate the direct re-
placement of management through a premium hostile bid, and
perhaps more important, management's fear of being replaced.
It would weaken the connection facilitated by control markets
between stock price signals and real economic decision making.
Second, the change would diminish institutional effective-
ness, especially insofar as the institution's power comes from its
ability to support (or credibly threaten to support) a control
entrepreneur. Rules against hostile bids would reduce the cata-
lytic presence of control entrepreneurs. Free rider problems
make it very unlikely that institutions would step up to more
vigorous engagement in monitoring, and a strategy of latent
activism would lose most of its force.
Third, closing down the control market would undermine
directorial monitoring of management. The collegial setting of a
board makes it hard to hold management to account; an active
control market reminds directors that if they do not perform
the task, their positions too are at risk. This stiffens directorial
willingness to insist on management accountability. There is
already evidence that directors are not as effective in an era of
constrained control markets in removing management at under-
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). For a more in-depth discussion on this trend, see
Gordon, supra note 6, at 522-31.
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performing firms, 3 and are especially slow, relative to control
markets, where underperformance affects an entire industry
sector.3' Further constraints on control markets would exacer-
bate these trends.
The consequence is not trivial. Such corporate governance
changes will, especially over time, reduce the speed with which
changes in the competitive environment are integrated into
decision making by a firm. If the success of U.S. firms in the
global economy is at least partly attributable to the corporate
governance regime, the present prosperity may well be at risk.
VI. THE APPOMATTOX OF VIRGINIA CORPORATE LAW
Seen in this light, recent developments in Virginia law, espe-
cially the statutes that sweepingly empower target boards, are
not salutary. The case that illustrates this is WLR Foods, Inc.
v. Tyson Foods, Inc.32 In late 1993 and early 1994, Tyson
Foods, the national poultry producer, made a series of overtures
to acquire WLR, a Virginia-based producer of chickens and tur-
keys.' 3 Tyson's offer was $30 cash for stock previously trading
in the teens. Notwithstanding the very substantial premium,
the WLR directors insisted the company was not for sale. They
were able to rely on a series of provisions in the Virginia corpo-
rate law to erect a barricade of defenses, including a flip-in
poison pill, behind which it could "just say no.'
In response to the board's resistance, Tyson launched a $30
per share tender offer.35 Under the Virginia Control Share Ac-
quisition Statute," Tyson could not vote a controlling interest
without prior approval of a majority of the "disinterested" WLR
shareholders. The WLR board undertook a number of actions to
enhance the probability of shareholder rejection of Tyson as a
30. See generally Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, The Decline of Take-
overs and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 207 (1997).
31. See generally Randall Morck et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Con-
trol, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 842 (1989).
32. 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 921 (1996) (affirming
several lower court opinions).
33. See id. at 1176-77.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 1177.
36. VA.CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Michie 1993).
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possible controlling shareholder. The board set the record date
to minimize voting by those who acquired WLR stock after an-
nouncement of Tyson's interest. Certain inside directors who
held approximately eleven percent of the WLR stock resigned as
officers (though receiving a severance package that included
lifetime health benefits). Under the federal court's somewhat
questionable interpretation of the Virginia law, the resignations
meant they were now "disinterested" shareholders and eligible
to vote."' Tyson lost the referendum."
The ultimate deal breaker, however, was the board's deploy-
ing of a flip-in poison pill with a 15% trigger that, unless re-
deemed, would impose a crushing financial penalty on the
acquirer. The important corporate law question is the standard
that governs the board's refusal to redeem the pill. The Virginia
statute, at least as construed by the federal court, gives direc-
tors unusually wide latitude. Apparently this creates the test of
a good heart but an empty head (good faith) in deciding how to
respond to a hostile bid. Even more remarkably, under the
federal discovery ruling in this case, Tyson could not make ade-
quate inquiry about the information presented to the board, in
particular, the substantive advice it received from its expert
advisors, to test the "good faith" claim.39 The district court
failed to understand that if even the "reasonableness" of the
board's decision could not be challenged as such, evidence of
unreasonableness would nevertheless bear on the good faith of
the board's decision making. How else to know whether the
board acted in "good faith" (rather than from a disabling con-
37. See WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1177.
38. Tyson's losing the shareholder vote was an unusual event, only partly expli-
cable by the shift of the former officers to the "disinterested" column. Earlier in its
history, WLR was a chicken growers cooperative. When it was organized as a corpo-
ration, the growers received shares and entered into supply contracts with the new
entities. For many of the WLR shareholders, these contracts were much more econom-
ically important than the stock ownership. Tyson's threat, if any, was to displace
these growers with lower cost producers (or to push for renegotiation of the con-
tracts). This, rather than an inadequate stock price, was the threat of the Tyson of-
fer.
Moreover, many of the growers/WLR stockholders were concentrated in a spe-
cific region of Virginia, the upper Shenandoah Valley. The fact that votes would be
known to management and the potential informal community sanctions were likely to
have kept many potential dissidents in line.
39. See WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 492, 495 (W.D. Va.
1994), affd, 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995).
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flict of interest) except by inquiring into its decision making
process?
Tyson retreated and the WLR shareholders have not pros-
pered. Under incumbent management, WLR has underper-
formed both the industry and the stock market on earnings and
share price, which is now as of March 1998 around $10 a
share-against a tender offer price of $30. 4'
The Virginia anti-takeover statutes make for an unusually
preclusive package. There is a Control Share Acquisition Stat-
ute,41 which, as described above, limits voting rights of a hos-
tile bidder; an Affiliated Transactions Act,42 which limits the
ability of a hostile acquirer to accomplish a freezeout merger af-
ter obtaining a majority of the target's stock; a poison pill stat-
ute,' which permits defensive use of a shareholder rights plan
entailing discriminatory treatment of shareholders; and a busi-
ness judgment statute,' which establishes "good faith" as the
care level for directors.
The business judgment statute, which is the most lethal part
of the package, shows how the desperation of the anti-takeover
lobby can severely distort corporate law norms. In the interpre-
tation in WLR, the business judgment statute supplants the
common law business judgment rule, at least in tender of-
fers,45 and nothing in the statute limits its application to that
setting. Although the Virginia corporate law often follows the
Model Corporate Act, the Virginia legislature intentionally omit-
ted the Model Act's formulation of the business judgment rule
requirement that a director exercise "the care of an ordinarily
prudent person" and act in a manner "he reasonably believes to
be in the best interests of the corporation."' The director's
40. This adjusts for a 3 to 2 stock split subsequent to the withdrawal of the
tender offer. Over the March 1993 to March 1998 period, WLR's stock has produced
annualized returns of -13.72%, compared with industry returns of +16.42%. See Wall
Street Journal, Company Briefing Book: WLR Foods, Inc. (visited Mar. 6, 1998)
<http//interactive.WSJ.com/inap-bin/bb?sym=WLR&page--3>.
41. See VA.CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Michie 1993).
42. See id. §§ 13.1-725 to -727.1.
43. See id. § 13.1-646.
44. See id. § 13.1-690.
45. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d at 1172, 1182-83 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 921 (1996).
46. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984).
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only obligation under the Virginia statute is to "discharge his
duties as a director... in accordance with his good faith busi-
ness judgment of the best interests of the corporation."47 The
requirements of "ordinary care" and "reasonableness" are gone;
"good faith" remains.4' Moreover, the poison pill statute explic-
itly makes issuance and redemption of a pill subject to the
standard of the business judgment statute. On a "good faith"
standard, a board should be able to stand fast behind a "just
say no" defense, virtually immune from judicial scrutiny. This
goes well beyond the directors' duties statutes in other states,
which permit boards discretion (under the customary care level
of judgment) to take into account the "long term interests" of
the corporation and its shareholders or the interests of other
constituencies. It seems that a the board of a Virginia corpora-
tion can resist a hostile bid for any reason (short of a disabling
conflict of interest) and need not even defend the reasonable-
ness of its actions against any metric. This is troublesome not
only for the total surrender of the duty of care, an Appomattox,
but also because of the impact on the duty of loyalty. A process
that never samples the air of justification may miss uncovering
the odor of corruption.
One metaphor for corporate law, in the takeover area, is the
statutes and the court decisions as the control rods in a nuclear
power plant. A regime of total laissez-faire in these matters
may lead to reactions that are too intense and to a pattern of
business reorganization that could be too disruptive, too error
prone, and too costly. But a regime that is too protective will
shut the reactor down. As I have argued previously, this will
deaden the corporate governance regime and enervate the com-
petitive responses that have led corporations to success in the
New Economic Order.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Michie 1993).
48. See Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1185 (2d Cir. 1995) (discuss-
ing legislative history); Daniel T. Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A
Prnmer, 20 U. RICH. L. Rv. 67, 108 (1985) ("The statute... may... protect the
utterly inept, but well-meaning, good faith director.").
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